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spo nse a re rich and va ried. That 
we need to develop some empirical 
rules of thumb to check our arbi-
trariness in some o f the hard c ases 
occasioned by our increased tec h-
nological skill is no t in questio n. 
As Eric Cassell suggests , "The func-
tion o f mo rality in medicine is no 
lo nger simply to protect the weak 
and the sic k from indifference o r 
venality , but to protect them also 
fro m mercy grown overwhe lming 
by techno logical advance.'' How-
ever, the de velopment of such rules 
o ( thumb must be developed with 
the kind o f e xac tness that such 
cases e nta il, rather than with the 
generality that opens them to the 
perversio n o f justifying o ur uncare 
o f those who do not fit our c urrent 
standards o f " full y human." 
reach out and provide cart or 
those who have no " right" to i• 'ut 
more concretely, as importa• as 
crite ria a re to inform deci ns, 
we canno t make them do a ~ he 
work o f e thical judgment and JU-
ment fo r all cases, since no l er-
ion is going to relieve o r s! J ld 
make less troublesome the b· len 
of dec iding to operate to sa' the 
life o f a severely retarded chi! To 
try to substitute "imperson e~. cri-
teria" for wh at should be the lral 
agony of suc h decisio ns is alre 1 to 
sacrifice mo re of our human it" 1an 
we can stand. 
In this respect, I think a strong 
cautionary no te needs to be inte r-
jected about developing c rite ria 
of the human that will someho w re-
lieve us of the hard choices tha t we 
are confro nting in modern medi ~ 
c ine. Fo r c rite ria that are suffi-
c ient fo r a ll the kinds of cases we 
confro nt will be· so vague tha t the ir 
concre te implications will be am-
biguous at best. Even if you try to 
make suc h c riteria mo re ope ra tio n-
al fo r the doctor by tying the m to 
empirical charac teristics. it is by 
no means c lear that the mo ra l ques-
tions involved in many o f these 
cases will be any more resolvable . 
For eve n tho ugh suc h. crite ria may 
help you dec ide that this life is not 
"fu lly human ," the questio n o f 
whether c are should be given still 
remains , I suspec t tha t we are hu-
man exac tly to the extent we can 
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Finally. I think we sho ut, feel 
mo re the oddness of trying to ter-
mine this o r tha t as the criten hat 
makes us human. The con1 ons 
of being human form a far tO\ om· 
plex patte rn to be ever redu· I to 
some thing like "criteria ." r oo 
quick appeals to the myst • of 
being hum an can be but excu ~ , for 
cloudy and sloppy thinkin~ that 
attempts to evade some of th-. hard 
issues we are confronting, bt they 
may also be pro found respo n ·s to 
the huma n sense that ultimatt· v we 
are no t our own creato rs. T1 ne a 
man is to be open to the call o ~.v hat 
we are no t, and there is theref ·e no 
cha nce that our humanity \\ ' I be 
enhanced by excluding fro r our 
ranks those who do not undt.: , rand 
as we. We must therefore app oach 
the attempt to develo p crit\ r ia of 
the human with the humilit '- that 
recognizes tha t we would he less 
than human if we did not recngnize 
that there are limits to what can be 
bro ught under our control. 
Linacre Quarterly 
Definition and Criteria of Clinical Death 
Robert F. Rizzo, Ph .D . and Joseph M. Yonder 
Synopsis . 
Using the 1968 Journal of the 
American Medical Association arti-
cle on brain death by the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School and the 1972 lAMA rep ort 
by the Task Force on Death and 
Dying of the Institute of Society . 
Ethics and the Life Sciences on a 
re-examination of brain death as 
SP_ringboards for a contemporary 
VIew of clinical death. the authors 
present the ambiguities and prob-
lems intrinsic to these articles and 
concurrently propose an alternative 
in I he form of a \\'Orkin~ hypo1hesis 
for clinical death as it re lates 10 
care of the terminal palient. 
Clinical Death 
With technical progress in the 
care of the sick and dying comes a 
number of problems and a need to 
r~examine traditional presupposi-
tions, concepts and procedures. Ad-
vances in chemical and mec hanical 
means for sustaining life have raised 
questions concerning the clinical 
definition of death and the tests for 
determining when clinical death has 
occurred. Though these questio ns 
have important relevance to a wide 
range of legal as well as perso nal 
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and medical matters, they have im-
media te bearing o n the role of the 
physician in his relationship of 
trust and service to the patient and 
community and on the quality care 
of the terminal patient. These are 
o ur major co ncerns in reexamining 
the definitio n and criteria of clini-
cal death. 
Medical techno logy has chal-
lenged the moral and medical c ri-
teria for determining death . Tech-
nical advances in health care have 
led some to put emphasis on "brain 
death" rather than on heart and 
respiratory cessation as the criteria 
for diagnosing clinical death. The 
stra in of moving from heart and 
respiratory cessation to bra in dea th 
reveals the inadequacy o f present 
medical and moral guidelines in the 
face of an increasingly sophisticated 
technology. Deeply wo ven in the 
c ulture o f o ur society , the re 
e merges the central question of the 
controversy. Are we really inte r-
ested in the quality care o f the pa-
tient and partic ularly the te rminal 
patie nt? 
In the care of the dying, a rede-
finition of clinical death and its c ri-
t e ria wo uld mean that doc to rs 
wo uld withdraw extraordinary mea-
sures for sustaining life much soon-
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er , a llowing the patient to die with 
d igni ty a nd in peace. By "extra-
ord inary measures·· is meant a ll 
a rtificial life-sustaining procedures. 
W e are de fining "extraordina ry" as 
has been commonly understood by 
many moralists. In M edico-Moral 
Problems, G erald Ke lly, S. J. , gives 
the traditiona l, moral definitio n as 
follows: 
By these we mean all medicines, treat· 
ments, and operations, which cannot 
be obtained or used without excessive 
expense, pain or other inconvenience, 
or which , if used, wo uld not offer a 
reast•nahlc ho pe of benefit.1 
It should be noted that the phrase 
" reasonable hope of benefi t" means 
tradit ionally reasona ble hope of 
substantial or real benefit. It signi-
fies reasonable prognosis of e ven-
tual recove ry from a debilita ting ill-
ness or of carrying the patient over 
a te mpo rary c risis , factors whic h 
Dr. Robert Rizzo received his 
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lege, Buffa lo, N. Y., f or the past 
five years and is presently A ssis-
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fo r the Master of Art degree at 
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yean Mr. Yonder has worked in 
Western New York hospitals and 
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offset the pa in , inconvenienct .tnd 
expe nse of the procedures. 'A !th-
er a measure is e xtraordina or 
ordinary canno t be d ecided 1 the 
abs tract. The c ircumsta nc t of 
each case must be carefully 'lm-
ined before a prudent judgme r .:an 
be made. According to a num r of 
mo ralists, if a n a rtificial m~ .ure 
offe rs no hope of substa ntial ·me-
fit in a particula r clinical sitl tOn, 
it is considered e xtraordinary ven 
tho ugh it may not b e o f a n < Jeri-
me ntal na ture.2 W e could late 
the moral distinc tio n betwe ex-
traordinary and ordina ry me ~ to 
the gene ra l care of the te rmi ' pa-
t ient a nd the rights · o f the 1 ie nl 
to decide for o r aga inst ex t •rdi-
na ry meas ures as mo ra lly d, ned. 
He re we limit o urselves to 1 king 
the obvio us conclus io n that liag-
nosis of cl inical de a th baseL ln a 
ne w set o f c rite ria wo uld me • t h ~: 
withdrawal o f a ll arti ficia life-
sustaine rs at a n earlie r st . ~ of 
te rmina l care. 
The funda menta l questio 
fro nting us in the redefi nit 
cl inical death is whe the r de<• 
process o r an e vent. Techno 
advances have provoked a 
sid e ratio n of the tradi tional 
t io n and tests. C linical de< 
con-
n of 
1 is a 
•gical 
l!con-
'e fini-
1 has 
c ustomarily been d efined in terms 
o f cessation o f heartbeat, ' •<;p ira-
tio n a nd reflexes. 
As Vincent J . Collins point'i out. 
the re are three possible ~ .tys of 
lo oking a t death : clinical , Piologi-
cal and theological.3 C linical death 
has been customa rily ide ntifi ed by 
the cessation o f the functioning of 
certain organs, a fact which signi-
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fied the dissolu tion of the integ rated 
organism we call huma n life. Clini-
cal death has never been in theory 
or practice ide ntical with complete 
biological death . For suc h a death 
entails the death of a ll organ sys-
tems. It is o bvio us the n that bio-
logical death is a process more o r 
less gradual, depending o n the c ir-
cumstances. Even under the trad i-
tional criteria , afte r clinical death 
was pronounced , some organs and 
tissues we re still a live, con tinuing 
a metabolic func tion fo r ho wever 
brief a ' time. In prac tic e . this fac t 
had little re leva nce. Bu t the point 
that bears re peating is that practi-
cally and theore tically clin ical dea th 
and biological death a re not iden-
tical even under the ~rad it iona l pro-
cedures. As regards theological 
death , it is defined as the mo ment 
the soul leaves the body. Catholic 
theology theorized tha t the soul did 
not leave the body immed ia tely 
upon clinical death but lingered fo r 
a short time. T he obvio us uncer-
tainty o f suc h specula tion e limi-
nates the possibility o f using the 
concept of theological death as a 
relevant tool in reexamin ing medi-
cal procedures and establishing a 
working clinical definitio n of death . 
Biological a nd theological death 
must be regarded in theory a nd 
practice as distinc t fro m clin ical 
death . 
Sophis ticated techno logica l ca re 
of the patient is the major cause in 
the reexa minatio n of traditio nal c r i-
teria. Since the heartbeat and res-
piration can be a rtific ially ma in-
tained for a time by c he mical stimu-
lants and mechanical devices as the 
Nove mber. 1973 
respirator in spite of the eviden t 
brea kdown of t he organic who le 
a nd its own s uppo rt systems, the 
re thinking of clinical dea th a nd 
its tests needed o nly a prod from 
necessity, a facto r which techno l-
ogy provided . M o reover, the use 
of the electroencephalograph ha s 
turned attentio n to the cessatio n 
of brain functio ns or brain dea th 
as a defini tive ind icatio n of clinical 
death, despi te the presence of ar -
tificially ma inta ined heartbeat a nd 
respira tion. T h e shift from hea rt 
death to bra in death is a good exam-
ple of how technical progress ca n 
open new ho rizons and thinking but 
also create a set o f proble ms and 
ne w opportunities for decision. 
The lsoelectric EEG 
For those who have kept abreast 
o f the discussio n surrounding the 
reevaluatio n o f cl inical death, the re 
a re certain gene ra l points tha t 
e me rge fro m writings o f the subject . 
The eli minating o f heartbeat as a 
de fini tive sign o f huma n life is ge n-
era lly accepted by those who foc us 
o n brain death. The isoelectric 
EEG is rega rde d as a confirming 
rathe r than a dete rmining sign. Fo r 
example. Franc is D . Moore writes: 
A fla t EEG is no t e no ugh. There musl 
be somelh ing tha t can be seen by the 
unaided eye whic h tells the observer 
thai the brain is damaged. extruded. 
divided . or destroyed. Then. with 1he 
to tal cessation o f neural activity o f 
the brain. the state o f the o ther organs 
can be whateve r sui ts the recipient 
best. Even if lhe heart is slill bealing. 
there is no questio n for the coroner or 
the lawyer. T he dono r is dead .4 
T he Report o f the Ad Hoc C ommit-
tee of the Harvard Medical School 
says essentially the same but more 
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specifically by laying down de· 
tailed c rite ria and mode of proce· 
dure in the definition of brain death. 
A patient in this state appears to be 
in deep coma. T he condition can be 
satisfactor ily d iagnosed by points I , 2 
and 3 to follow . The electr oencepha· 
logram (point 4) provides confirma· 
tory data, and when available should 
be utilized.5 
Brie fly the well-known c riteria are 
the fo llowing:6 
I. U nrece ptivity and unrespo nsivity 
to even the most painful stimuli . 
2. No spontaneous muscular move· 
ments o r spontaneous respiration 
or respo nse to stimuli suc h as 
pain , touch, sound o r light, veri-
fied over at least an ho ur. 
3. Absence of cere bral and spinal 
re flexes. 
4. T he fla t EEG verified by compe· 
tent specia list. 
In the case o f a patie nt on a me· 
c h a nica) res pira to r , th e R e po rt 
sta tes precisely the procedure as 
fo llows: 
The total absence of spontaneous 
breath ing may be establ ished by turn· 
ing off the respirator for thr.ee min· 
utes and observing whether there is 
any effort on the part o f the subject 
to breathe spontaneously . (The res· 
pi rator may be tu rned off for this time 
provided that at the star t o f the trial 
per iod the pat ient's carbon dioxide 
tension is wi thin the normal range. 
and provided also that the patien t had 
been breathing room air for at lea.~t 
10 minutes prior to the tria1.7 
With the exception of two condi· 
tio ns, hypothermia . (temperature 
below 90 F o r 32.2 C) and coma re-
sulting fro m centra l ne rvous system 
de pressants, the failure of these 
tests, repeated at least 24 hours 
la te r, indicates brain death. The 
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Repo rt offers these crite ria n mg· 
gested guidelines whic h a l :tor 
could follow in diagnosing c ical 
death . 
T he fl at EEG is the refor· pre· 
sented as confirmatory rathe han 
a de te rminative indication o t lini· 
cal death within the conte J< pro· 
posed by the Report. It is ·this 
po int tha t our problem begir We 
a re a ttempting to establish ~ eria 
for clinical death, while rc< ~n iz· 
ing b iological death as a proct not 
who lly identical with clinical ath. 
In this context, we must ask ,eth· 
er the death of the cerebra l rtex 
or neocortex signals hum an ath, 
even tho ug h othe r parts of thl rain 
may s till be functioning for , tme. 
We a re posing this questio n 1 re· 
gard to the quality of te rmi na :are. 
The Repo rt does not he lp us • an· 
swe r the above questio n dire <.. v be· 
cause it introduces c riteria hich 
re la te to the func tioning o t •ther 
parts o f the brain and o f the ntral 
nervo us system in gene ra l. liS tS 
evident in its focus o n spo n t•· leous 
breathing, cerebral and spir t1 re· 
flexes, and respo nse to sti m :li. It 
is clear then tha t brain death neans 
for the H arvard Committe ( total 
cessation o f bra in func tions ,. "to· 
tal bra in death" and no t simr ces· 
satio n of the neocortical fu n tions. 
T he Commi ttee has re intrc luced 
all the tradi tional c rite ria w. h the 
exceptio n o f heartbeat in a patient 
on a mechanical respira tor. In the 
case o f suc h a patient who L1i ls all 
the above tests, heartbeat ts not 
regarded as a definiti ve sign uf hu· 
man life s ince it is artific ially main· 
taine d . Comme nting o n the Har· 
Linacre Q uarterly 
· vard Committee Report , the Task 
Force on Death and Dying of the 
Institu te o f ·society, Ethics, a nd 
the Life Sciences makes the follow· 
ing observation : . 
T he new criteria are meant to be 
necessary fo r only that small percen· 
tage of cases where there is irrevers· 
ible coma w ith permanent brain dam-
age, and w here the traditional signs 
of death are obscured because o f the 
intervention of resuscitaiion machin· 
ery. The p roposal is meant to comple· 
ment not to replace. the t radi t ional 
cr i teria of determ ining death .a 
Perhaps the elimination of heart· 
beat as a d e fi nitive sign of li fe in 
certain cases might seem to some a 
revolutiona ry step. But in prac tice 
the proposals of the Harvard Com-
mittee do not amount to a real 
change in the evaluatio n of death . 
In contrast , we would propose the 
question whethe r the re is h uman 
life in the event of the death of 
the neocortex as indicated by ne u-
rophysiolog ical s igns. 
In this area, the re is suffic ie nt am-
biguity and Jack of c larity. For ex-
ample, the Task Force (mentio ned 
above), in a ttempting to clear up 
ambiguities surrou nding the mean-
ing of death, notes that we are 
talking of "the death of the human 
organism." It the n goes o n to s ta te: 
It may make a considerable difrcr· 
ent.:e which of tht: two terms " hu· 
man" or "organism " - is given prior· 
i ty. Emphasis on the former might 
mean that t he concepts o f life and 
death would be most linked to the 
higher human func t ions. and hc n~·e . 
to the fu~c tion ing o f the central ncr· 
vous system (CNS). and ult imately. 
of the cerebral cortex. Emphasis on 
the latter might mean that the con· 
cepts of life and death wou ld he most 
November. 1973 
linked to mere vegetative existence. 
and hence. to· the function ing o f the 
circula tory system and the heart.9 
T his ana lysis adds to the ambigui ty 
by ascribing the higher fun c tions or 
human fun c tio ns to the CNS a nd 
cerebra l cortex in the sa me breath . 
For part of the brain or part o f the 
CNS is large ly involved in con trol· 
ling vegetat ive fun ctio ns in a ll verte-
brates. C. U. M. Smith in The Brain. 
fo r example. describes the fun c tio ns 
of the med ulla in this fashio n: 
The medul la i tself. although rela-
ri,·ely undifferent iated - it st ill sho ws 
the four functional columns of the 
sp inal cord - is of considerable im· 
porta nee in the body's economy . It 
is from th is part of the brain that 
many o f the vital automatic activities 
o f the viscera are controlled. For ex-
ample. nerve centers in this structure 
regulate the activity of the heart . 
lungs and alimentary canal : the cali· 
ber of the arterioles in many parts 
o f the body ; the metabolism o f carbo· 
hydrates: the osmo tic pressure of the 
blood. These nerve centers are. how· 
ever. themselves of ten governed by 
centers fu rther forward in the brain .IO 
T he CNS, therefore. is too broad a 
phrase to designate what controls 
highe r h uman func tions. We offer 
the hypoth esis that human death 
should be related to the cessation 
of functio ns d istinc tly human since 
breathing, heartbeat and c ircula tio n 
are vegetative processes shared by 
othe r animals. 
F ro m the evidence accum ula ted 
from a batte ry of psychological. 
neurologica l and physiological tests. 
Ale ksand r Luria in High Cortical 
Functions s tates tha t ''the cerebra l 
cortex, the most highly organized 
part of the e nti re centra l nervo us 
system. has come to be regarded as 
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a high-level center for analysis and 
integra ti on o f signals received by 
the organism from its internal and 
externa l envi ronment."11 T he highe r 
mental functions are dependent o n 
the integrated functioning of vari-
o us centers of the cerebral cor tex 
o r neocortex.12 The functio ning of 
the cortical centers cover a wide 
range of phenomena from the pro-
cesses of perception a nd move ment 
to complex systems of speech and 
intellectual activity. Since the bra in 
operates as an integrated who le 
with its systems neurally interre-
la ted, the neocortex certainly does 
no t pe rform its higher tasks inde-
pendently from othe r parts of the 
centra l ne rvous system. However, 
with its death, it is equally certain 
that the remaining systems canno t 
substitute for the neocortex to ef-
fect the integrated operations that 
result in the higher mental fun c tio ns 
associated with human pe rceptio n. 
unde rstanding and judgment. From 
all clinical evidence, the death of 
the neocortex marks the e nd of the 
physiological basis for human con-
sciousness, that is , a consciousness 
unique in its powers of reflectio n. 
It signals the end of the brain as a 
dynamic integrated whole and pre-
sages in most cases the imminent 
death of o ther cerebral systems. 
Two Exceptions 
In o rder to point up the rele-
vance of our hypothesis and line of 
reasoning, we would like to c ite 
some findings and conclusions pre-
sented in an article e ntitle d "Neo-
cortical Deat h After Cardiac Ar-
rest," which appeared in Lancet. At 
the o utset, the autho rs no te tha t it 
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is gene ra lly acce pted that a 1 
with severe brain dam age re 
fro m head injuries, cerebra\ . 
acc ident o r cardiac arrest 
no unced dead in the presenc 
isoelectric EEG (strictly d t 
lack of re flex reactio n a nd m 
cally sus tained respiration a 
diac functions. They go on 
sent the cases of two patien 
irreversible brain damage al 
diac a rrest who were e xcept1 
their surviving fo r five mon t 
a flat EEG. 
In case one. eye-opening . ya' 
wit h associated movements. SP<'' 
ous respirat ion and certain 
activities at brainstem and spin;., 
levels were present; wh ile in ca 
the resumed central nervous a 
was restricted to spontaneous r 
tion and certain brainstem and 
cord reflexes. In both cases 
physiological investigations led 
conclusion that the neocorte 
dead while certain brainsten 
spinal centres remai ned intact 
sequent detailed neuropathot 
analysis confirmed this predict 
each case.13 
ent 
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Witho ut going into all th e d t a ils of 
the cases and o f the test g. we 
would like to po int up o bse1 >ations 
a nd conclusio ns re levant o our 
d iscussio n. 
Case o ne and two were c 1 nically 
ide ntical except fo r the fact that in 
case o ne brainstem and spina l reflex 
acti vity was no t in evidence until 
the second day after the arrest and 
respiration was sustained by me· 
chanica! ventilation for 17 days.14 
The diagnosis of " neocortical death" 
was made from a " persiste ntly iso· 
e lectric E. E.G. and the absence of 
sensory evoked respo nses in the 
Linacre QuarterlY 
neocortex , together with the re-
sumption o f spontaneous respiration 
and o f certa.in brainste m re flexes."l5 
The autho rs distinguish " neocortical 
death" fro m "brair. death '' o r "total 
brain death" in which ins ta nce there 
is no reflex activity a nd no spon-
taneous breathing along with an iso-
elec tric EEG. In each case, the 
neuropathological ev idence con-
firmed the neurophysio logical data 
which indicated the d eath o f the 
neocortex with the continua tio n of 
certain brainste m and spina l fun c-
tions for five months. This confir-
mation prompted the authors to 
propose that " it is likely that a 
systematic study of sensory evoked 
cortical potentials and the EEG as 
soon as possible afte r cardiac arrest 
could identify the ex istence of neo-
cortical death earlier than was pos-
sible in the present cases. ''16 As in 
other cases of isoelectric EEG, the 
presence of depressant drugs in 
the sys tem must be take n in to con-
sideratio n in evaluating the tests. 
To remove a ny doubts, " neocortical 
death could be confirmed by the 
appro priate neuropatho logical ex-
amination o f a biopsy specime n (a 
1-1-5 em. cube) taken fro m the 
poste rior half o f a cerebral hemi-
sphe re."t7 
The st udy of these two cases 
brings the authors to ask the fu nda-
menta l question we have raised. 
name ly, whethe r wit h the evidence 
dea th o f the neocortex a nd conse-
quent irreversible loss o f co nsc ious-
ness a nd accompanying hig he r me n-
tal fun c tions there is still hum a n life. 
They ask this q uestion fo r the same 
reasons indicated above . The way 
November, 1973 
we a nswer it. wi ll affect the con tin-
uation of intensi ve care for the 
patie nt with respect to h is rights to 
die with dignity. It is obvious to 
th e m as well as to us that the Har-
vard Committee Report is concern-
ed about criteria for establishing 
total brain death with its particular 
focus o n reflex responses and spo n-
taneous breathing whic h a re indi-
cative of cerebral functio ns carried 
on in spite of neocortical death. 
Thus, the Harva rd Com mittee 
ma kes c linical death dependent no t 
o n th e cessation o f the highe r human 
functions o r o n th e death of the 
physiological bases for these func-
tions but on the cessation o f vege-
tative functions shared by o ther 
a nimals. It is this feature which we 
find inadequate. 
We must not only deal with the 
state o f the art as it i~ now but as it 
will progress. T herefore, the event-
ua l problems of defining brain death 
could easily threaten the quali ty of 
li fe for the patien ts with terminal 
conditio ns. From the Lancet artic le, 
the re is the prospect of countless 
individ uals being mainta ined after 
the ir neocortex is dead . As tech-
niquesand instrumentatio n improve, 
the patient without higher neocorti-
cal functions will be maintained fo r 
lo nger periods and with greater fre-
quency.18 Beca use of the Harvard 
Committee Report's focus on spon-
taneous breathing and reflexes as 
definit ive signs of h uman life, it is 
in fact relegating a neocortically 
dead pa tient to a ''vegetative" ex-
iste nce promoted by machinery and 
drugs. 
We feel there are three reasons 
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for upgrading the criteria for clinical 
death: ( 1) the patient's right to die 
with dignity and the attendant care 
of the terminal patient ; (2) the hard-
ships imposed upon the family and 
workers surrounding the patient : 
and (3) the unfairness of withhold-
ing organs from those who need 
them desperately. The primary and 
majo r reason o f dignity really invol-
ves both care of the terminal patient 
and clinical death. If we have no 
suitable c riteria for clinical death as 
indicated in terms of neocortical 
death, then patients o f the type des-
cribed above could become even 
more prevalent as medical techni-
ques pro long their vegetati ve exis-
tence. At the same tim e. their 
families will suffer no t only the ex-
pense but also the anguish o f the 
long wait until a cardiac arrest or 
super infection destroys the vege-
tative drives. T here is also the possi-
bility that care of the patient w ill 
be le£t to the efficiency o f machines 
and therefore depersonalized. M ore-
over, those in need of transplants 
will necessarily have to wait, even 
tho ugh this could be a de·ath knell 
for many. Thus these three reasons 
present strong ev idence for the 
need to re-evaluate the traditional 
criteria. even as updated by the 
Harva rd Committee. and then the 
need to establish new c riteria for 
clinical death. 
Neocortical Death 
There fore. we propose as an hy-
po thesis that , when there is incon-
trovertible evidence of neocortical 
death . then human life has ceased. 
It appears then that cessation of 
spontaneous breathing and re flexes 
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should not be absolutely requi r in 
determining clinical death iP 1e 
face o f neocortical death. W it 1e 
death o f the neocortex, huma. fe 
is ended because the potent ty 
to reflect consciously is eradi ' cd 
in the organism . There is en gh 
evidence to call this a pract lly 
certain conclusion. If we are lo ng 
for absolute certitude that thL · lUI 
or consciousness has departed 1m 
the body, we would never pr ' ed 
to declare the person dead 1til 
every organ is organically ' nt. 
We would not follow the H < trd 
Committee Report. The pr;; cal 
decision is based on practical rti· 
tude that human life has c· ed. 
Practical certitude means ' ply 
that one is confident that, aft e. tre-
ful investigation , there is non. mal 
reason to fear error. It is PL aps 
here that many physicians are luc-
tant to d efine cl inical de<• in 
term s of neocortical death bt tuse 
of th eir uncertainty as to th re li-
ability of neurophysiological ests 
in indicating irreversible ces tion 
o f neocortical funct io ns: H o1 ·ver, 
as progress is made in th i -.. area 
thro ugh the refinement of ech-
niques, as for example prese• ·d in 
The Lancet article. confidenl · will 
grow in th e methods o f testin neo-
cortical death. Our proposal 1.., that. 
when physicians have practi~ I cer-
titud e of the reliabili ty of t h ~ tests. 
the incontrovertible indicat i1 n ~ of 
neocortical death suffice as L ri teria 
for d etermining clinical deat h. 
Perhaps what is needed is a philo-
sophical definition o f human life 
and death. Admittedly an adequa te 
and universally accepted C\111Cept 
would be difficult to formu lat..: and 
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express. But it does seem sa fe to 
propose. that when the capacity or 
potentialit y ·for higher mental fu nc-
tions, fo r reflec tive consciousness, 
ceases. then human li fe ceases. 
Physicians must rely on neurophysi-
ological signs of cessation, among 
which is the persistent isoelectric 
EEG. They cannot and should not 
invo lve themselves in the unanswer-
able question w hether or not the 
soul or spirit consciousness leaves 
the body at a particular point in the 
biological process o f death. Now 
that the heartbeat has been removed 
at least theoretically as a definitive 
sign of l ife in the certain cases, 
breathing as well as heartbeat must 
be seen in its proper context. Cultu-
rally this will be diffi cult . For just 
as the heart has been associated 
with the seat o f life and emotions. 
so breathing has become synony-
mous with life. There is no intention 
to say that heartbeat, breathing and 
reflexes are unimportant. But th ey 
must be seen in their bi ological con-
text , in their relationship to the or -
ganic whole we call human life. 
When the essential prerequisite for 
human consciousness no longer 
exists, that is, when the neocortex 
is dead, then heartbeat, breathing 
and reflexes sho uld not be regarded 
as signs of human life but rather 
signs of biological life which has 
lost the organ ic wholeness that 
makes it human life and which is 
in the process of dying o rgan by 
organ. 
Customarily doctors move fro m 
the cessation of vital signs to the 
realization that the neocortex and 
then the rest of the brain are dead. 
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Now with modern techniques, there 
can be a ne\~ situation and order of 
procedure. The physic ian can start 
with the neocortex and proceed to 
the realization that with its death 
the biological wholeness which is 
human li fe and makes possible hu-
man consciousness and personhood 
is irrevocably gone. H ence human 
death has occurred even in the pres-
ence o f some heartbeat, breathing 
and reflexes. 
Safeguards 
But is there no t the danger o f 
making a rash diagnosis at the ex-
pense o f the patient? There is al-
ways the danger that every set o f 
principles and procedures will be 
misused. So there is need for safe-
guards as well as for some concrete-
ness in establishing criter ia. There 
is the obvious need to verify w ith 
practical cert itude the death o f the 
neocortex through anatomical and 
neurophysio logical data. As regards 
the use of the EEG, it is well to note: 
However. a greal deal o f caution and 
no little expertise is required to con· 
elude I hat a record is indeed .. isoe lec· 
tric ... The number and placemenl of 
e lectrodes. length of the recording 
and st:nsilivity as well as filte r sett ings 
all are cruc ia l in making this diagnosis. 
EKG and EMG monitori ng channels 
are very he lpful in determining art i· 
fac tual po1en1ials. Even a fter deter· 
mining th at .. electrocerebral silence .. 
is present. its significance must be 
dete rm ined. Repeated tracings at 
variable inte rvals have been recom· 
mended. Massive overdoses of CNS 
depressanls and hypothermia may 
e rroneously lead to a premature diag-
nosis of "cerebral death." 19 
T here must . therefore, be incontro-
vertible evidence of neocortical 
death . But such evidence would 
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suffice to declare the patient clini-
cally dead. There may still be signs 
o f biological life, that is, of life pro-
cesses of organs and tissues. H ow-
ever. as stated above, in regard to 
human death. the focus should be 
o n what constitutes human life and 
makes possible human conscious-
ness and personhood. If the neo-
cortex is the physiological prere-
qu isite for human consciousness, 
for the ability to associate, reflect . 
judge, appreciate and evaluate , then 
the total cessatio n of its func tions, 
once deemed irrevocable. o ffers 
practically certain gro unds for the 
diagnosis o f clinical death. 
Another safeguard would be the 
se tting up o f a hospital board to re-
veiw the decisio ns. espec ially in 
cases o f potential donors. T his 
would help to refine procedures and 
eliminate anxiety in the team caring 
fo r the patient and the transplant 
team . A s suggested by the Harvard 
Committee, one precaution would 
be the distinction between the team 
o f physicians that cares for the 
patient and thus has the responsi-
bility to declare clinical death and 
the team which may be involved in 
the transplant operation.20 Natural -
ly, the rights of the next o f kin must 
be respected and consent for trans-
plant procedures received after the 
details o f the case are given. 
In establishing new criter ia fo r 
clinical death , medic ine should no t 
look to law for a set o f guidelines. 
It is intrinsic to the m edica l profes-
sion that it set th e criteria for deter-
mining death . Thus the law and the 
public look to medic ine to define 
and protect the c riteria. Of course, 
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this is accompl ished not in isol •n 
but in d ialogue with other p ·s-
sions and the general comm y. 
But the responsibility bears h. ly 
upo n the medical pro fession 1 e-
velo p standards for prolongin fe 
and determining death. As thl tr-
vard Committee Report state~ 
No statutory change in the law slH 
be necessary since the law treats 
quest ion essentially as one of fat:' 
be determined by physic ians. The 
c ircumstance in wh ich it woult1 
necessary that legislation be off, 
in the various states to define ''de; 
by law would be in the event that!! 
controversy were engendered 
rounding the subj ect and physit 
were unable to agree on the 
medical criteria.21 
George P. Fletcher, profes~ of 
law, concurs that physicians th tgh 
commonly accepted practice· '>La-
blish the criteria for dec ision~ re-
gard to prolonging life and dt ·ing 
death. 
By establish ing customary stand. 
they may determ ine the expectat 
of their patients and thus regulatt <: 
understanding and relationship .:· 
tween doctor and patient. . And )' 
regulating that relationship, they •Y 
control their legal obligations to n· 
der aid to dll0111cd patients.22 
Phys ic ians should see tht re-
spo nsibility in its many dimen tms: 
first and foremost , toward t l pa-
tient with his right to die in ~ace 
and with dignity: secondly. It ward 
the next of kin , who could be snared 
the ordeal of witnessing the dying 
of a loved one prolonged b) artifi-
cial measures beyond the hope of 
substantial benefit to the patient : 
thirdly. toward the potential re-
c ipient of a transplant. The urgency 
of re-examining the criteri a for 
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clinical death is more imperative 
in view of technological advances 
in intensive care which i ncrease the 
chances o f patient's ··survivar· for 
extended periods wirh·out a func-
tioning neocortex. 
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